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Labor Adjustment and Gradual Refonn: 
Is Commitment Important? 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  the  transition  toward  market  economies  has  been 
associated with high unemployment, creating the potential for social instability and threatening 
continued  liberalization.  Many  workers  who  move  from  (fonner)  state-owned  fIrms  are 
unemployed for a time before fmding jobs in private fInns.  Short of maintaining an unacceptable 
status quo,  high  unemployment during  transition  may  be  inevitable.  Some economists  and 
policymakers think that governments should smooth the transition path, and intervene to save jobs 
in the short run.  There is an obvious political and social rationale for intervention.  Government 
intervention  may  also  be  justifIed  on  efficiency  considerations,  if market  failures  lead  to 
"excessive" unemployment.  In this case, we would like to know the optimal path of intervention. 
This paper presents a continuous time,  infInite horizon model in which  some workers 
leave the dying state sector and pass through the pool of unemployed workers in order to obtain 
better jobs in the growing private sector.  There is congestion in the labor market.  In making 
their  migration  decisions,  workers,  who  have  rational  expectations,  fail  to  internalize  the 
congestion cost  The private solution leads to  excessive migration and unemployment, which 
justifIes government intervention. 
In principle, the government could correct congestion by using a migration tax or a wage 
subsidy,  and  thereby  achieve the fIrst-best  migration  trajectory.  In  practice,  any  policy that 
affects migration is likely to  introduce other distortions, so available policies are  ollly  second 
best.  We consider the case where the  government's only policy instrument is a tariff.  This 
modeling choice is motivated by the fact that tariffs remain an  important means of protecting 
state sectors. 
The fact that workers are forward  looking,  together with  the assumption that the only 
available policy instrument introduces a secondary distortion, implies that the second best policy 
trajectory is time-inconsistent.  We study two extreme cases: the government has either perfect 
or zero commitment ability.  The difficulty of making credible commitments about future policy 
is particularly acute in reforming countries, because of the absence of an institutional structure 
that support policy continuity.  With perfect commitment ability, the government announces and 
follows the second best trajectory. With zero commitment ability, neither non-intervention nor 
the second best trajectory are equilibrium outcomes.  Analysis of the two extreme cases enables 
us to determine whether the equilibrium is  sensitive to  the degree of commitment ability. 
Our  objective  is  to  answer  the  two  following  questions:  How  important  is  the 
government's ability to  commit to future actions?  How does the answer to  this depend on the 
nature of the labor migration process?  Using numerical simulations, we fInd that the eqUilibrium 
tariff trajectories under both unlimited and infInitesimal commitment ability are qualitatively the 11 
same,  and  in  both  cases  involve  gradual  liberalization.  Therefore,  the  inability  to  make 
commitments does not necessarily provide an argument against gradualism. 
In an earlier paper, using a different model of migration, we showed that a government 
with perfect commitment ability begins with complete liberalization, but then phases in and later 
phases out protection.  With that model of migration, nonintervention is the equilibrium outcome 
when the government has zero ability to commit. The relation between these contrasting results 
and the contrasting assumptions about labor migration in the two models provides a key insight. 
It is well-known that "commitment matters", in the sense that the equilibrium changes 
with the degree of commitment.  However, what is not known is whether commitment matters 
very much. We think that this is the more interesting question. Given the current state of data, 
economists cannot provide precise recommendations concerning policy trajectories.  For the 
purpose of advising governments, the comparative statics of optimal trajectories with respect to 
small changes in  commitment ability,  is  probably  not very  useful.  It is,  however,  useful  to 
detennine whether the shape of a policy trajectory can change for large changes in commitment 
ability. The framework we study enables us to answer this question. Labor Adjustment and Gradual Refonn: 
Is Commitment Important? 
1. Introduction 
The transition toward. market economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has 
been associated with high unemployment, creating the potential for social instability and 
threatening continued liberalization.  Although the historical evidence on the relation between 
economic liberalization and unemployment is ambiguous
l
,  the theoretical relation is 
straightforward..  A change in relative prices requires that some sectors shrink and others 
grow, and this requires the adjustment of labor.  For many workers, the move from one sector 
to another involves a period of unemployment.  The loss in production during this period is 
an important economic cost of the transition.  Since beginning transition, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Poland have experienced unemployment rates of approximately 15%, and East Gennany's 
rate has been twice that.  The labor markets of CEE have been described by, inter alia, 
Akerlof et al. (1991), Begg and Portes (1992), Blanchard et al.  (1993), Bofinger and 
Cernohorsky (1992), Dornbusch (1992), and Svejnar (1993). 
High unemployment during transition may be inevitable.  It may be impossible to 
avoid the costs associated with labor adjustment, except by maintaining an unacceptable 
status quo. However, many economists and policymakers think that the market solution 
1  Papageorgiou et al.  (1991) study 36 liberalization episodes in  19 countries and fail to 
find a significant relation between liberalization and increased unemployment.  Edwards 
(1988) and Greenaway (1993) provide other interpretations of this evidence.  Some of the 
episodes in the study involved very mild fonns of liberalization, from which it is difficult to 
make any inference. In most cases it is difficult to isolate the effect of trade refonn from the 
effects of other policy changes. 2 
involves unnecessary and unacceptable costs, and that governments should intervene to  save 
jobs in the short run.  Abel and Bonin (1992) and McKinnon (1991,  1993) discuss arguments 
in favor of gradualism; Rodrik (1989) and Dewatripont and Roland (1992) study the political 
economy of liberalization.  Methods of protecting the dying state sector include trade 
restrictions, soft budget constraints, and direct subsidies.  There is an obvious political and 
social rationale for these policies.  They may also be justified on efficiency considerations, if 
market failures lead to "excessive" unemployment.  However, the question remains whether 
governments should attempt to reduce unemployment by supporting dying industries.  If  they 
should, we would like to know the optimal path of intervention. 
We study a model in which some workers leave the dying state sector and pass 
through the pool of unemployed workers in order to obtain better jobs in the.growing private 
sector.  There is congestion in the labor market, which means that an increase in the number 
of unemployed decreases the probability that any single worker will get a job. In making their 
migration decisions, workers fail to internalize this congestion cost.  The decentralized 
solution therefore leads to excessive migration and unemployment, and a role for government 
intervention.  This model is adapted from Lapan (1976, 1978, 1979), Cassing and Ochs 
(1978) and Ray (1978).  Worker_s have rational (point) expectations, which in this 
deterministic model implies perfect foresight. 
In principal the government could correct the distortion by using a migration tax or a 
wage subsidy cum tax, and thereby achieve the first best (social planner's) migration 
trajectory.  In practice, however, any policy that affects migration is likely to introduce other 
distortions, so available policies are only second best.  We consider the case where the 3 
government's only policy instrument is a tariff, which results in a consumption and (possibly) 
a production distortion.  This modeling choice is motivated by the fact that tariffs remain an 
important means of protecting (former) state sectors.  For our theoretical results, the fIrst 
important assumption is that any available policy instrument introduces a secondary distortion. 
Given the state of the tax system in CEE, this is plausible. The second important  assumption 
is that workers are forward looking, and therefore base their migration decision on their 
expectation of future policies. 
These assumption imply that the second best policy trajectory is time-inconsistent.  2 
Outside of a steady state, the government would like to announce, and promise to follow, a 
particular policy trajectory; agents know that in subsequent periods the government would 
want to revise that trajectory.  In the absence of a mechanism for commitment, agents do not 
believe that the announced policy will be followed,  so it is ineffective.  The diffIculty of 
making credible commitments about future policy is particularly acute in reforming countries, 
because of the absence of an institutional structure that supports policy continuity. 
Recognition of the commitment problem is one reason for opposing government 
intervention.  A common scenario is the following:  A government wants to announce a 
gradual reform trajectory, e.g. a reduction in tariffs, which balances the benefIts of adjustment 
and the costs of unemployment.  Workers recognize that in the future the -government will 
have an incentive to deviate by increasing (or failing to decrease) the tariff.  This leads to a 
2  The issue of time consistency in  trade models has been widely studied.  See, for 
example, the papers by Brainard (1993), Karp (1987), Maskin and Newbery (1989), 
Matsuyama (1990), Staiger and Tabellini (1987), and Tomell (1991).  Staiger and Tabellini 
(1991) study the empirical importance of commitment. 4 
suboptimal amount of migration, which increases the government's incentive to renege 
(because not reneging leads to high migration and adjustment costs). (See, e.g., Staiger and 
Tabellini, 1987).  Consequently, a proposal to reduce gradually the level of protection leads 
instead to continued protection and the failure to make needed adjustments.  In this case, the 
government might do better to eschew intervention altogether, adopting the "big bang" 
approach to reform.  Proponents of this view presumably believe that it is easier to commit to 
a trajectory of non-intervention, than to a trajectory of phased liberalization. 
Our objective is to develop a framework for answering the following two questions: 
How important is the government's ability to commit to future actions?  How does the answer 
to that question depend on the form of the labor migration process?  We consider two 
extreme possibilities: the government has either perfect or zero commitment ability.  In the 
former case it announces - and follows - the second best trajectory.  In the latter case, the 
government can set the policy at any level it chooses in the current period, but cannot make 
promises about the future.  In reality, a government'S ability to commit is neither perfect nor 
non-existent, but analysis of the extreme cases enables us to determine whether the outcome 
is sensitive to the degree of commitment ability.  This has important policy implications.  In 
circumstances where commitment ability is relatively unimportant, one argument against an 
interventionist policy (e.g., favoring the big bang) is less compelling. 
Karp and Paul (1994) address these issues using a different model of migration.  For 
that model, a government with perfect commitment begins with complete liberalization, but 
then phases in and later phases out protection.  The big bang is used, but is short-lived.  In 
the same model, nonintervention is the equilibrium outcome when the government has zero 5 
ability to commit; the big bang is pennanent  In the current model, governments with either 
perfect or zero commitment ability follow qualitatively similar policy trajectories. 
Liberalization is gradual and monotonic.  The relation between these contrasting results and 
the contrasting assumptions about labor migration in the two models provides a key insight 
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 analyses 
the properties of the private adjustment and derives the fIrst best subsidy. Section 4 compares 
the second best tariff policy under two extreme assumptions regarding the government's 
ability to make binding commitments. Section 5 discusses the role of the labor migration 
constraint The last section contains concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
Our theoretical discussion uses a continuous time, infinite horizon model.  This makes 
it straightforward to present the model under either extreme assumption about the 
government's commitment ability.  We use a discrete stage, finite horizon approximation for 
numerical results.  For the zero-commitment case, we assume that agents have Markov 
expectations.  Agents condition their actions and beliefs about the future on the payoff-
relevant state variable(s), which }n this case is the stock of labor in the growing sector.  The 
Markov assumption is adopted in many models that study time-consistency and government 
policy (e.g., see references in note 2). In infInite horizon models, there typically exist many 
non-Markov (reputational) subgame perfect equilibria (Chari and Kehoe,  1990, Stokey, 1991). 
One reason for studying those is to show that when  "reputation" is introduced to a model, the 
government (or other decision-maker) is able to achieve nearly the full-commitment outcome 6 
even with negligible commitment ability.  This is possible because "punishment" strategies 
can be used to support "good behavior", in much the same manner as is done in repeated 
games. 
However, we show that even with the Markov restriction, the lack of commitment 
ability is not very important (in our particular model).  The question of which is more 
empirically relevant, Markov or reputational equilibria, depends on the specific situation being 
modeled.  We think that the Markov assumption is reasonable in CEE, where a reputation is 
harder to establish because of uncertainty about government longevity (e.g. the rapid turnover 
of Prime Ministers in Poland).  Csaba (1994) describes the volatility of trade policy in·CEE. 
2.1 Model Basics 
We consider a small open economy with two sectors, each of which produces a single 
good using labor under diminishing returns to scale.  The fixed supply of labor is L. Good 1 
is both imported and domestically consumed.  Liberalization leads to a decline in sector 1 's 
price, and we call this the decliiling sector. The restricted revenue function of sector i is 
Ri(pi'~)' where Pi and Li are output price and amount of labor for sector i. Letting subscript j 
denote a partial derivative with respect to the j'th argument, we have R~ equal to the sector i 
output supply and R~ equal to ~e  sector i wage. Hereafter we set p = Pl/P2' the free trade 
relative price of sector 1 output; L = Lz,  labor in sector 2; and U equal to the amount of 
unemployment.  The labor employed in sector 1 is then L - L - U.  When the .dying sector is 
protected by a unit tariff of 't, the relative price of commodity 1 is p + 'to 
There is a continuum of workers in each sector, and a residual claimant (e.g. a 
capitalist or government ministry).  All agents have the identical homothetic expenditure 7 
function E(p+t,J), where ui is agent j's utility.  With homothetic preferences, we can write 
the expenditure function as yjE(p+t), where yj is defined as agent j'  s real income and E(P+t) 
is the unitary expenditure function. 
2.2 Dynamics 
Workers who leave the dying sector pass through the pool of U unemployed workers 
before being employed in the expanding sector. The probability that an individual worker gets 
a job over an interval of time dt is f(U)dt.  We assume that fCU)  is positive for all U and that 
f(O)  is finite. Therefore, the expected duration of unemployment for the "last unemployed 
worker",  l/f(O), is greater than zero.  We define 11  as the elasticity of f with respect to  U,  11 
== UfCU)/fCU).  The assumption that there is congestion in the labor market implies that 11  < 
O.  This assumption is supported by empirical evidence and can be given a formal 
justification, as in Cassing and Ochs (1978). 
Workers have rational expectations regarding future wages and future levels of 
unemployment.  The present discounted value at time t of the wage differential in the two 
sectors is <It  == fa  e-rs  [R~(t+s) - R1(t+s)]  ds, where r is the discount rate.  This implies 
lfp  - ]  2  q = rq  + R2  +t,L - L  - U  - R2 [L]  . 
We suppress the time index when this does not lead to confusion.  The variable q is the 
private value (to a worker) of a successful job search. 
(1) 8 
Following Lapan (1979), the equilibrium migration decision is given by the 
complementary slackness relations R1 -fq  :2!  0, V  :2!  0, and [R1 -fq]V  ==  o?  Outside the 
steady state, where V > 0, we have 
1  - R2(P+t,L -L - U)  -f(U)q =0.  (2) 
The opportunity cost of looking for a job over a unit of time is the foregone wage, R1,  and 
the expected benefit is the probability of getting a job during that interval, feu), times the 
present value of having a job in the growing sector, q.  The opportunity cost of migration can 
not be less than the expected benefit.  If  it were less, migration would increase; this would 
increase V, resulting in an increase in the wage in the dying sector and a decrease in the 
probability of fmding a job.  Equation (2) states that if unemployment is positive, the 
opportunity cost of migration equals the expected benefit. 
We can use (2) to write unemployment as V = VeL, q, t).  Totally differentiating (2), 
shows that VL < 0 and Vq > O.  An increase in the level of workers employed in the 
expanding sector decreases the wage there, making jobs in that sector less attractive. This 
decreases the level of unemployment by making workers in the dying sector less willing to 
leave their jobs.  An increase of  the present value of the future wage differentials makes 
workers more eager to leave the declining sector and causes a rise in unemployment. 
3  This relation assumes that workers base their migration decision on  a comparison of  _ 
the present value of labor income.  If  workers are unable to borrow (as we assume below), 
they might weight income in a period by the marginal utility of income.  This would change 
the definition of q.  Karp and Paul (1994) discuss this extension, but we do not pursue it here. 9 
Implicit in (2) is the assumption that when an unemployed worker wants to  give up 
his search, he instantly gets a job in the dying sector at the going wage: unemployment is 
voluntary.  There clearly does exist involuntary unemployment in CEE.  Nevertheless, the 
model captures the important stylized fact that labor mobility is asymmetric.  Workers can 
move more easily into the dying sector, with which they are familiar, than into the unfamiliar 
expanding sector. 
Given a continuum of unemployed workers of measure U, and the probability, f(U), 
that an individual worker gets a job, then by the law of large numbers the measure of workers 
moving into the growing sector is Uf(U).  This implies 
dL =  Uf(U) 
dt 
(3) 
We assume that the elasticity of congestion with respect to unemployment, 11,  satisfies 0 > 11 
> -1, so that higher unemployment leads to higher engagement rates in the expanding sector. 
Equations  (1), (2) and (3) define the dynamics of the economy. The stock of workers 
L is the predetermined variable of the system. The private value of migration, q, is a jump 
variable; its initial value is endogenous. 
3. Equilibrium under Non-Intervention and with a First Best Policy 
As a preliminary to studying the model with and without commitment, using a second-
best tariff, we first summarize the characteristics of the model under non-intervention and 
using a first best, nondistortionary policy.  In  this section, therefore, we set 't = o. 10 
3.1  Private adjustment without government intervention 
From (5), a steady state requires that U = O.  From (1) and (2),  steady state values of 
L and q, denoted by "*", satisfy 
Ri(L *)  - Ri(L - L *)  Ri(L - L*) 
q * = -------- =  ---::":"::":"'--
r  1(0) 
The steady state wage differential is given by 
Ri(p,L - L *)  =  1(0)  Ri(L *)  . 
r  + 1(0) 
(4) 
(5) 
The quantity L  * is the smallest steady state; there exists a range of values greater than L  * that 
are also steady states.  For example, if L is slightly larger than L*, e.g. L*+E with E  ~ 0 and 
small, the wage differential is positive (so workers would not leave the growing sector), but 
the differential is not high enough to induce workers to leave the dying sector and risk 
unemployment.  Therefore, L* +E is also a steady state.
4  Provided that the initial value of L 
satisfies Lo < L  *,  as we assume, the economy converges to L  *.  There is full employment at 
steady state.  The steady state wage differential is positive, and the ratio of the steady state 
wages, f(O)/[r + f(O)],  is a decreasing function of r and an increasing function of f(0).5 
4 Appendix A discusses the non-uniqueness of the steady state and other details of the 
private adjustment equilibrium. 
S  This model has an interesting relation to the familiar Harris-Todaro (1970) model, in 
which an exogenous wage determines the probability of unemployment; the causation is 
reversed here, with the exogenous probability, f(O),  determining the wage differential. 11 
If  the economy is originally at the steady state L·  (p) given by equation (5), and p falls 
(e.g., as a result of liberalization), there is a sudden jump in unemployment.  Workers leave 
sector 1, the dying sector.  Thereafter, unemployment is monotonically decreasing, and the 
growing sector monotonically increasing as the higher steady state is approached.  If  all quits 
occur in the first instant, the dying sector is monotonically increasing, as some unemployed 
workers return to that sector.  However, if  congestion is sufficiently important, workers may 
leave the dying sector more slowly, in which case the size of that sector (after the initial 
jump) falls for a time, and then rises. 
3.2 The fIrst best policy 
Suppose that the government is able to control migration directly, and can therefore 
prevent it from occurring too rapidly.  The government wants to maximize the present 
discounted value of revenue,  f'O  e-rs  [Rl(p, L-L(HS)-U(HS)) + R2(L(HS))] ds subject to  (3). 
The fIrst order conditions for its problem include 
Ri  - J1 [f(U) + U/'(U)]  =  0  (6) 
(7) 
The variable  J1  is the social shadow value of labor in sector 2.  Integrating the differential 
equation in (7), using the transversality condition, implies that J1  ==  q, for a given trajectory of 
L and U.  Therefore, comparison of (6) and (2) establishes that (during adjustment) private 
decisions are socially optimal if and only if f'(U) ==  0, so  there is no congestion (Lapan,  1978, 
Cassing and Ochs, 1978).  However, even with congestion, the steady state under private 12 
adjustment and the socially optimal steady state are equal.  This is due to the fact that in both 
cases unemployment vanishes in the steady state, so congestion is unimportant there. 
When there is congestion, the socially optimal trajectory can be decentralized by 
giving a wage subsidy cp(t)  to workers in sector 1.  Those workers receive the wage Ri +  cpo 
The private value of migrating is now q, which is the solution to d4ldt = rq + Ri + cp  - R~. 
Using (6) and (2), with q replaced by q, and simplifying, we have that the optimal cp  satisfies 
(8) 
where U and Jl  are the solutions to (6) and (7).  The wage subsidy at time t equals the sum of 
two terms: -f(U)1lJl is positive, and is due to the presence of congestion; the sign of f(u)(q -
Jl)  is negative if the trajectory of future subsidies is positive.  The anticipation of future 
subsidies makes the private value of migration less than the social shadow value of labor in 
sector 2; in order to partly offset this disincentive to migrate, a lower current subsidy is used. 
We note four properties of the optimal wage subsidy,  cpo  First, in the steady state cp  = 
O.  This can seen by substituting the steady state values for Jl  and q into (8).  Second, the 
optimal cp  is positive during a final phase of the trajectory.  This can be shown using a proof 
by contradiction, as follows.  Suppose that cp(t)  :s;  0 for all t  £  [t, 00),  for some t.  Then the 
last expression in (8) implies that cp(t)  > 0,  which contradicts the hypothesis.  Consequently, 13 
over a final part of the adjustment phase, the subsidy is positive, and it decreases to 0.6 
A third property of the optimal wage subsidy is that it is subgame perfect (and 
therefore time-consistent), despite the fact that it is obtained by solving a control problem in 
which forward-looking agents have rational expectations.  The government's control problem 
has a "jump state", i.e. one whose initial condition is endogenous, a situation associated with 
time-inconsistency problems.  Here, however, under the optimal program the value of the 
jump state is optimal for the government at every point, and not just at the initial time.7  The 
intuition for this result is simply that the wage subsidy enables the government to  achieve the 
6  Lapan (1976) derives the optimal wage subsidy in the case where wages are required to 
be equal in the two sectors because of an institutional constraint.  In that model, migration is 
an exogenous function of the unemployment rate, but does not depend on workers' 
expectations about the future.  The subsidy in that model corrects two distortions: the fact that 
workers do not internalize the congestion they cause, and the distortion that arises from the 
wage equalization constraint.  The first distortion disappears in the steady state, but the 
second persists.  Therefore, the steady state subsidy is positive in Lapan's model. 
7  To show this formally, we can set up the government's control problem when it 
chooses  <I>  to maximize the present discounted value of national revenue.  First, define H
S  as 
the government's Hamiltonian when it chooses U directly: H
S  = RI  + R2  + pUf(U).  This is 
the Hamiltonian used to derive (-6)  and (7).  Define the function  g(q,L,U,<I»  == rq + R1 + <I>  -
R~ = dq/dt, and define  J3  as the government's shadow value of the jump state q.  The variable 
q was defined in the text; it is simply the private benefit of migration, given the subsidy.  We 
want to  show that on the optimal trajectory,  J3  ==  0;  the interpretation of this identity is that 
the value of the jump state is optimal for the government at every point.  The equilibrium 
unemployment is given by the relation R1 + <I>  = f(U)q, which we write as  U = U(L,q,<I». 
When the government chooses  <I>  as the control variable, its Hamiltonian is H ==  H
S  + J3g,  . 
where we have used the constraint U = U(L,q,<I»  to eliminate U.  At an interior solution, the 
first order conditions are (i)  oH/o<l> =  0, (ii) -oH/oL = p - rp, and (iii) -oH/oq =  ~ - rJ3.  If the-
reader writes these three equations out, and evaluates them on the first best trajectory, where 
(6) and (7) are satisfied, (s)he will see that  J3  ==  0, as was to  be shown. 14 
fIrst best equilibrium; the government has no incentive to renege at a future date.8 
The fourth property is that the social marginal value of unemployment is identically 0 
on the optimal trajectory.  We have seen that the wage subsidy supports the fIrst best 
outcome.  On that trajectory the shadow value of labor in sector 2 is p.  The marginal unit of 
unemployment generates a flow of f(U) + Uf'(U) units of labor into sector 2, for a marginal 
benefit of p[U + Uf'(U)].  The cost is the foregone wage, R1.  By equation (6), the marginal 
benefit and cost are equal. This equality does not hold under a second best policy. 
4. The Second Best Tariff 
In empirically relevant circumstances, the government is seldom able to correct a 
distortion without introducing other, secondary distortions.  It is well known in this case that 
the full-commitment (open loop) trajectory is time-inconsistent.  Therefore, if the government 
cannot make credible commitments about future behavior, it looses some of its ability to 
influence private agents.  We wish to know if this is likely to  be is an important problem.  In 
this model, the lack of ability to make credible commitments is not very important. 
We assume that the government can use a tariff.  If  this protects the dying sector, it 
raises the wage there, as would ~ wage subsidy.  This slows migration, reduces 
unemployment, and reduces congestion costs.  However, it also causes a consumption 
8  Solving the control problem described in footnote 7 shows that the government has no 
incentive to renege from the optimal wage subsidy on the equilibrium path.  However, it is 
straightforward to  show that the optimal subsidy can be supported as a subgame perfect 
eqUilibrium.  Denote the optimal subsidy as q,*(t)  and the optimal state trajectory as L  *(t). 
Since the latter function is monotonic, we can invert it and then write the optimal subsidy as 
q,**(L), i.e., in "feedback form". 15 
distortion.  In a more general model with other mobile factors, the tariff would also cause a 
production distortion.9 
4.1 Perfect commitment 
At time t the tariff is t(t). Real income for the economy is Y;  using the notation in 
Section 2.1, total expenditure is YE(p+t).  We assume that there is no international 
borrowing, so that the deficit in the balance of trade, D, must be 0 at all times: 
D(Y,t,L,q,U) =  0 =  YE(p  + t) _Rl(p + t,L -L - U)  _R2(L) 
-t[Y~(p +t) -Rll(p +t,L -L -U)]. 
(9) 
The first term on the right hand side of (9) is total expenditure, the next two terms give the 
value of total production, and the third gives the tariff revenue, assumed to be redistributed in 
a lump sum.  The government wants to choose a trajectory of t  and Y to maximize the 
present discounted value of real income, I'O  Ye-rsds,  subject to  (1), (2), (3) and (9).  This is a 
standard control problem with a free initial condition for the jump state, q.  The Harililtonian, 
necessary conditions, and definitions, are collected in Table 1.  The costate variables for L and 
q are 131  and 132;  the constraint multiplier for (9) is A.,  which is the marginal utility of income. 
The open loop steady state tariff is 0, and the optimal steady state size of sector 2 is 
the same as under private adjustment or the wage subsidy.  This is not surprising, since the 
9 We have also studied a similar model in which the government is able to use a wage 
subsidy, but it costs $(I+c) to raise $1  of government revenue, c > O.  The qualitative results 
are unchanged.  The existence of a secondary distortion, not its source, is what matters. 16 
externality vanishes in the steady state.10 
Outside the steady state, the optimal tariff solves equation (12).  This expression 
decomposes the effect of the tariff at time t into three tenns, the "import effect", the 
"announcement effect" and the "unemployment effect"; optimality requires balancing these. 
The first tenn in (12) is the static import loss (measured in units of utility); this equals the 
change in imports (the decrease in demand, plus the increase in production of good 1) times 
the tariff.  The import loss includes the consumption distortion in standard static models. 
Since we have assumed that laboris the only mobile factors the production distortion of those 
static models is absent here. However, there is a production effect, since the tariff reduces 
migration, which increases the amount of labor and hence production in sector 1. 
The second tenn in (12) is the announcement effect.  The tariff changes the wage in 
sector 1 by Ril - u~k,  which equals the change in the value of marginal productivity caused 
by both the change in producer price, and the change in the amount of labor employed. From 
equation (1), this changes the evolution of q;  the shadow value of q is  ~2'  We designate 
~2[Ril - U~i2] as the "announcement" effect because this tenn captures the dependence of 
the optimal tariff on the forward looking variable, q. 
10  Steady state values (denoted by "*")  (t*,~~) = (0,0) imply that U* =  0 and  ~r = 
A,*Rilf(O), using (12) and (15).  Using (13), we have  ~t = A.*dlr,  where d is the wage 
differential.  Setting these two expressions for  ~r equal to each other gives the equation for 
the steady state (5) under private adjustment. 17 
TABLE I 
Open-loop Tariff Policy 
Hamiltonian 
H '" Y + A. [-YE(P  + 't) + R I (p + 't, E  - L  - U)  + R 2(L)  + 't [YEI (p  + 't)  - R/(p + 't, L - L  - U)]] 
+ PIU!(U)  + P2[rq  - d(p  + 't,E  - L  - U)] 
Maximization conditions 
1  A.  '"  __  --_-
E  - 'tEl 
'tA.[Y~1  + U'tR2
1





U  '"  <  0  't  I 
R22  + f(U)q 
2  I  - d(p  + 't,L) '" R2(L)  - R2(p  + 't,L - L  - U) 
I  - 2  h(p  + 't,L) '" R22(P  + 't,L  - L  - U)  + R22(L)  <  O. 
BOWldary values and Transversality conditions 
L(O) =  La  lim q(t) e-
rt =  0 
t~ 
~(O) =  0 
L = stock of labor in sector 2 
q =  PV of future wage differentials 
A. =  marginal utility of income 
PI =  costate variable of L 
P2 =  costate variable of q 
U =  unemployed 
d =  current wage differential 
h =  sum of the slopes of marginal productivities 
't =  tariff 
s =  net social value of migrating 








The initial value of q, q(O),  is detennined by the trajectory of tariffs, {t(t)}7=o.  The 
government chooses this trajectory and therefore indirectly chooses q(O).  The boundary 
condition  ~2(0) = 0 states that the equilibrium q(O)  is optimal.  This boundary condition 
implies that the announcement effect equals 0 at the initial time.  Since q depends on future 
events, the tariff at time t affects previous values of q.  At the initial time, t = 0 there are - by 
definition - no previous values of q that can be altered; since q(O) is optimal, a change in that 
value results in no first order improvement in welfare.  Consequently, the announcement 
effect does not contribute to the initial tariff. 
The third term in (12) is the unemployment effect.  This equals the value (in units of 
utility) of the tariff's effect on migration.  This value is the product of U't  (the effect of the 
tariff on unemployment) and s (the net social value of unemployment, which we discussed in 
Section 3.2).  An increase in unemployment increases migration to the second sector by the 
amount f(U) + Uf'(U); the value (in units of money) of the marginal migrant is  ~1/A. (the 
shadow value of labor in sector 2 divided by the marginal utility of money).  The cost of a 
unit of unemployment is the value of foregone production,  R~.  Since AU't < 0, the sign of the 
unemployment effect equals the sign of -so 
The sign of the initial taIj.ff equals the sign of -so  This can be seen from the slope of 
the Hamiltonian, evaluated at time 0, at a 0 tariff: aH/at I  t=O,'t=O  = U'tAS  =:) sign {  aH/at I  t=O,'t=O} 
= sign {-s}.  Under private adjustment, migration occurs too quickly, leading to excessive 
unemployment; consequently we expect s < 0, and the initial optimal tariff to be positive.  At 
the initial time, the optimal tariff is chosen to balance the import effect and the 
unemployment effect. 19 
If  the government announced the optimal tariff trajectory at time 0, and was able to 
re-optimize at a later time t> 0, it would want to change it's original plan.  The optimal tariff 
is time-inconsistent.  The reason for this is related to the announcement effect, the second 
term in equation (12). Define i'(t) as the value of the optimal tariff in effect at time t,  which 
is announced at time t' :s;  t.  The optimal time-t tariff announced at the initial time, 'to(t), 
affects the migration decisions over the interval [O,t).  At time t,  those decisions are 
"bygones"; they cannot be affected by anything done at time t or in the future.  If  the 
government re-optimizes at time t, it ignores previous migration decisions in choosing the 
tariff trajectory over [1,00).  In other words, the choice of the tariff to be in effect at time t is 
governed by different considerations at times 0 and at t, so il(t) * 'tt(t).  Another way to see 
this is to note that the shadow value of the jump state,  132'  is not identically 0
11 
,  in contrast 
to the first best wage subsidy.  If  the government is allowed to re-optimize at time t > 0, 
optimality of the subsequent trajectory requires that 132  = 0 at t. 
4.2 Infinitesimal Commitment 
We now consider the case where the government is unable to  make binding 
commitments; we restrict attention to  stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE).  At time t 
all agents (the government and  ~orkers) observe the state,  ~, and condition their point 
expectations about future variables, such as tariffs, wages, and levels of L, on  ~. All agents 
have the same information at t and the same point expectations.  For example, we denote 
11  Suppose, to the contrary, that 132  ==  O.  Then equations (14) and (16) imply that 't  ==  0; 
This identity and (14) then imply that s  ==  O.  However, in our discussion of the first best 
wage subsidy we noted that there s ==  0 (the fourth property), and this requires a non-zero 
subsidy over at least part of the trajectory.  Therefore, non-intervention ('t  ==  0) is not 
consistent with s ==  O. 20 
rCLt,t') as agents' conditional expectation of the tariff at time t+1', for t' ;;::  0, given Le 
These expectations (functions) induce an expectation of the forward looking variable q.  We 
write this function as qe(L.,t'); at time t, agents' point expectation of the value q will take at 
time t+t', depends only on the current value of L and on t'.  In order to write this relation, we 
require only that the underlying expectations functions are stationary, and that they are 
sufficiently regular so that when substituted into equation (1), the resulting expression has a 
solution.  We defme the function Q(L) =  qe(L,O), and assume that dQ/dL is continuous. 
Hamiltonian 
TABLE 2 
MPE Tariff Policy 
H=Y+/..[-Yi(p +t) +RI(p +t,L -L -U) +R2(L) +t[Yil(p +t) -RII(P +t,L -L -U)]]  (17) 
Maximization conditions 
1 
/..  =  ~-~--~ 
E  - tel 
t/..[ yill + U'tRil]  +  U~s =  0 
Adjoint equation 
+ ~Uf(U) 
Boundary values and Transversality conditions 
L(O) =  1.0  lim  ~(t)e·rt =  0 
t-+oo 
Consistency C01ldition 
dQ L  = q  = rQ(L)  - d(t,L) 
dL 






For any function Q(L), the government's problem is to choose policy rules that 
determine Y and 't in order to maximize the present discounted value of real income, subject 
to (2), (3) and (9).  The variable q which appears in these constraints is now replaced by the 
function Q(L).  This is a standard control problem, except that the function Q(L) is unknown. 
However, we can write the necessary conditions to the control problem, given an arbitrary 
function Q(L), and then impose a consistency condition to find the unknown function. 
The Hamiltonian and necessary conditions are given by equations (17) - (20) in Table 
2.  The costate variable for L is  p;  other terms used in the Table 2, A,  s, U't' d and h, have the 
same defmitions as in Table  1, although their values will of course be different.  There is a 
single state variable, L, in this control problem; in the open loop problem there are two state 
variables, L and q.  In solving the MPE, we lose a state variable, but gain an unknown 
function. 
In comparing the necessary conditions in the two Tables it is important to remember 
that in the MPE the function Q(L) replaces the variable q in the government's constraints. 
Equilibrium unemployment outside the steady state in both cases is given by equation (2), 
which for the MPE we can invert to obtain U = U('t,L,Q(L».  In Table (1) the expression UL 
is obtained by differentiating (2)  with respect to L and 't, holding q constant; in Table (2), 
however, we have UL  = aU/aL + (aU/aQ)(dQ/dL). 
Keeping in mind this qualification, we note the similarity between the necessary 
conditions (11) - (13) for the full commitment trajectory, and (18) - (20)  for the zero 
commitment trajectory. In particular, comparison of (12) and (19) shows that the 
announcement effect is absent in the MPE.  When the government is unable to make 22 
commitments about future tariffs, the tariff in place at time t is chosen without regard to its 
effect on previous migration decisions.  The other effects of the tariff, the import effect and 
the unemployment effect, are present and take the same form in both equilibria.  In both cases 
a tariff lowers utility because it causes a consumption distortion (the import effect), and 
increases utility because it lessens the gap between the social marginal benefit and cost of 
unemployment, s (the unemployment effect).  The import effect and the unemployment effect 
influence welfare in the opposite direction.  Therefore, the importance of the ability to make 
commitments depends on the relative importance of the announcement effect vis a vis the net 
effect of the import and unemployment effect. 
The consistency condition for the MPE is given by equation (21).  This is not a 
necessary condition to the control problem. It is a restriction on the  .. unknown function Q(L) 
to insure that when the government chooses its optimal policy rule ~(L), taking as given 
Q(L), agents' expectations are confmned in equilibrium.  (The superscript M indicates the 
equilibrium policy rule in a MPE.)  In terms of the notation introduced above, (21) must hold 
in order that ~(L)  ==  r(L,O). 
Thus far,  we have compared the OLE and the MPE using only the first order 
conditions which determine the !f3.nsition to the steady state.  We have seen that if the 
announcement effect in the OLE is small, the two trajectories are likely to be similar.  Similar 
trajectories require a similar steady state.  We have not yet discussed the steady state in the 
-"'  *  MPE, but we know it is L  for the OLE.  The necessary conditions for a stationary (infinite 
horizon) MPE do not determine the steady state.  There is  "one degree of freedom", so the 
MPE for the infinite horizon problem is not unique.  We briefly discuss the source of non-23 
uniqueness, and explain the additional restriction that enables us to  select an equilibrium. 
(Details are contained in Appendix B.) 
We are able to use the necessary conditions to  the MPE to obtain an ordinary 
differential equation for the equilibrium level of unemployment, dUM/dL.  (The superscript 
"M" denotes "Markov".)  Since the necessary conditions do not determine the steady state of 
L, they do not give us a boundary condition for dUM/dL.  [This is analogous to  the problem 
of an "incomplete transversality condition" discussed by Tsutsui and Mino (1990).]  However, 
economic arguments lead to a "natural boundary condition" for this equation.  As we pointed 
out above, there is an interval of steady states under private adjustment. We denote this 
interval as J = {L:  L*  ~  L ~  L*+e},  with L*  defined by equation (5) and e > O.  The first best 
wage subsidy and the open loop tariff are both 0 for L e J.  Over this interval, it is not 
optimal to induce migration, even if this could be done without introducing additional 
distortions.  Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that in the MPE, where policy-induced 
migration does require a distortion, the tariff will be 0 for L e J, and UM(L*)  = O.  This 
provides a natural boundary condition for dUM/dL, and this selects a unique eqUilibrium. 
In summary, if the initial value of L is small, so that migration would occur under 
laissez laire <Lo  < L*), then the  ~teady state size of the sector is the same under all of the 
policy regimes we have considered.  In every case there is no government intervention in the 
steady state.  Because we want to use this model to  study policy-making in reforming 
economies, the steady state is of limited intrinsic interest.  It is, however, important because it 
provides a boundary condition which determines the transitional dynamics.  In  order to examine 
the equilibrium trajectories under the various policy regimes we  use numerical methods. 24 
4.3 A Numerical Comparison 
Extensive simulation results establish the following properties of the equilibrium wage 
subsidy and tariff policies: (1) The time trajectories of these policies are all monotonically 
decreasing. (2) The fIrst year OLE tariff is similar to, but slightly lower than the fIrst year 
MPE tariff; from the second year on the OLE tariff trajectory is above the MPE's. 
Computational Method  We used the algorithm introduced by Fair and Taylor 
(1983)12.  Starting from an initial guess of the time paths of the jump variables, a sequence 
of temporary equilibria is computed, giving rise to a sequence of actual values of the jump 
variables.  A linear combination of initial guesses and actual values is computed in order to 
improve the guesses of the jump variable.  This procedure is iterated until a fixed point is 
reached.  To implement this algorithm, we replaced the continuous time control programs 
with their finite horizon, discrete time analogues.  The unit of time equals 1 year, the time 
horizon equals 20 years,13 and the discount, r, is set to 0.05. 
Calibration  We choose units so that p=l and L=l.  We use constant elasticity for the 
production functions, the expenditure function and the probability function: £(1 +t)=(1 +t)O.55, 
R1(I+t,L)=(1+t)(I-L-U)°.75,  R2{L)=Lo.75, andftU)=O.5(1+U)-I.  Using the discrete version of 
(5), the steady value of L is L  *  =0.401.  The initial condition is L( 1  )=0.1  so that 90% of 
12  This algorithm is  now used to  solve large-scale applied general equilibrium models 
[e.g. Keushnigg and Kohler (1994)]. 
13  In the finite horizon problem the non-uniqueness problem, discussed in Section 4.2, 
does not arise.  For a horizon of 20 years, the (endogenous) terminal value of L is L* under 
all policy regimes. 25 
workers are employed in the dying sector before migration takes place.  The boundary value 
L(20) is free and there is no scrap value. 
We conducted sensitivity tests by changing (i) the initial condition L(1), (ii) the 
functional form of the probability f(U) and (iii) the parameter of the expenditure function. We 
also changed the unit of time from a year to a quarter, thus reducing the government's period 
of commitment  In all cases the basic conclusions are the same. 
Results  We considered four policy scenarios: the private adjustment equilibrium 
(p  AE), the flrst best equilibrium (FBE), the open loop equilibrium (OLE) and the Markov 
Perfect equilibrium (MPE).  Figures 1 and 2 show the time paths of U and L in the four 
simulations.  The initial level of unemployment is 35% higher in the PAE relative to the FBE. 
However, the higher unemployment in the flrst years implies that workers flnd jobs in the 
growing sector more rapidly.  The steady state L*  and full employment are reached in about 
eight years under PAE and twelve years under FBE. 
The unemployment trajeCtories for the OLE and the MPE scenarios lie between the 
PAE and FBE paths.  The most important qualitative result is that for this model of 
unemployment the requirement of Markov perfection does not substantially reduce the efflcacy 
of government intervention.  Un~mployment in the MPE is first slightly higher and then 
slightly lower than in the OLE.  As a result, the MPE engagement rate in the expanding 
sector is higher in the flrst years. 
The time paths of the wage subsidy, the OLE tariff and the MPE tariff are shown in 
flgure 3.  The two tariff trajectories are both monotonic, so protectionism is phased out under 
either assumption about government commitment.  The trajectories are very similar, so  a large . 26 
change in the government's ability of making binding commitment does not affect the 
qualitative properties of tariff policy.  Both of these conclusions differ from results obtained 
using a different model of migration, which we discuss in Section 5. 
The fact that the initial MPE and OLE tariffs are similar could be due to two causes. 
The first explanation is that the announcement effect is very small compared to the 
unemployment effect.  The open loop trajectory is then mostly the result of the interaction 
between the import effect and the unemployment effect and therefore is similar to  the MPE 
tariff trajectory.  The second explanation is that the consumption distortion is relatively 
unimportant and therefore the open loop tariff is not "very" time-inconsistent.  However, if 
the second explanation were true, the three instruments (FBE subsidy, the OLE tariff and the 
MPE tariff) should have similar values in the fIrst year when the state variable is the same for 
each,.  This is not the case.  The initial open-loop tariff is about 9% lower than the initial 
subsidy,14 but only 1.2% lower than the MPE tariff.  We therefore eliminate the second 
explanation and conclude that the announcement effect is small compared to the wage effect. 
The fIrst year OLE tariff is lower than the frrst year MPE tariff because the 
announcement effect, although small, is not negligible.  In the MPE, the inability to  use 
announcements of future tariffs  ~o slow current migration, forces the government to increase 
slightly the initial tariff (relative to  the OLE).  Despite the fact that the initial MPE tariff is 
higher, we noted that initial unemployment is also higher.  Therefore adjustment occurs more 
quickly in the MPE.  This tends to make the second period MPE tariff lower than the OLE 
14  For given value of the state variable L, the wage subsidy is higher than the tariff, since 
the former entails no consumption distortion. 27 
tariff.  This tendency is reinforced by the fact that the second period OLE tariff is high partly 
because of the prior commitment.  To summarize, we see that the government's inability to 
make commitments causes it to begin with a higher degree of protection, but to reduce this 
more quickly (relative to the OLE).  However, the tariff trajectories under either zero or 
perfect commitment have very similar profiles. 
5. Comparison with an Alternative Migration Model 
The previous section suggests that when the migration decisions of forward looking 
agents involve an externality, the qualitative aspects of the optimal tariff trajectory do not 
depend on the government's ability to make commitments.  This conclusion appears 
diametrically opposed to the results in Karp and Paul (1994).  We explain the source of the 
difference in this section. 
In Karp and Paul (1994) agents incur a one-time cost in moving from the dying to the 
growing sector. If  L(t) workers migrate at time t,  the social cost is c(L) and the marginal 
social cost is c'(L). The market failure in this model is that agents' private costis a fraction e 
I 
< 1 of social marginal cost.  We assume that marginal costs are increasing, so that adjustment 
. is not instantaneousY  Equilibri~lm migration equates private benefits and costs: ec'(L) = q. 
We invert this to write 
(22) 
15  This is a fairly standard model of convex adjustment costs.  Krugman (1991) uses it in 
a model of intersectoral migration. 28 
Equation (22) replaces equations (2)  and (3), but in other respects the model is the same.  To 
distinguish the two migration models, we refer to the one described by (2)  and (3)  as the 
"unemployment model", and the one described by (22) as the "cost of adjustment model". 
In the cost of adjustment model, the current tariff has no effect on current migration: 
the tariff is not an argument of the function g(.).  The fIrst order condition in the control 
problem (for the cost of adjustment model) which corresponds to (12) does not have the third 
tenn, which we denoted the unemployment effect, although both the import effect and the 
announcement effect are present  The import effect is negative for nonzero tariffs and the 
announcement effect vanishes at time 0 (as is the case in the unemployment model), so the 
perfect commitment (OLE) tariff is zero at time O.  For t > 0 the announcement effect is not 
identically 0, so it is optimal to use a tariff.  Eventually, the tariff approaches zero as L 
approaches the fIrst-best steady state.  In the cost of adjustment model then, protection is 
"phased in and phased out" in the full commitment equilibrium.  In the zero commitment 
equilibrium, the announcement effect vanishes for exactly the same reason that was discussed 
in Section 4.2.  Since the import effect remains negative (for non-zero tariffs); and since there 
is no offsetting unemployment effect, it is optimal to  set the tariff identically equal to zero in 
the cost of adjustment model.16  _Thus, diminished commitment ability reduces the initial 
tariff in the cost of adjustment model.  We saw in Section 4.3 that diminished commitment 
ability increases the initial tariff in the unemployment model. 
16  The issue of non-uniqueness does not arise in the cost of adjustment model under zero 
commitment.  The reason is that whatever are the agents expectations, and the resulting 
(differentiable) function Q(L), it is optimal for the government to  set the tariff identically 
equal to  zero.  Therefore the only function Q(L) that is consistent with equilibrium is based 
on expectations of a zero tariff. 29 
It is useful to consider the discrete stage version of these two models for the MPE.17 
The length of each stage is E,  and in each stage the government sets the tariff before agents 
make their migration decision.  In this case, the lower bound on the period of commitment is 
E.  The discrete stage version of (1) is 'It =  e-reQ(~+J + d~,tt)E, where (as above) d(·) is a 
flow variable, giving the wage differential. From this relation it is apparent that the effect of 
the current tariff on 'It is proportional to E.  The discrete version of (22) is ~+£ = ~  + 
g(q/9)E, so the effect of 'It on the stock of labor in the next period is also proportional to E. 
Using the chain rule, or direct substitution, we see that the effect of the current tariff on ~+£ 
is proportional to  E2  in the cost of adjustment model.  We can write the flow of welfare in a 
given period as W(t,L); because of the consumption distortion, the current tariff reduces this 
flow.  Welfare for the period is simply W(t,L)E.  The welfare loss due to a non-zero tariff is 
therefore proportional to E.  Since the benefits (of affecting the state variable) are of a smaller 
order of magnitude than the costs (of distorting current consumption), the adjustment cost 
model implies that the MPE tariff must be small when E is small. 
The discrete version of (3) is simply ~+£ = ~  + Uf(U)E.  Unemployment is still given 
by equation (2), which is independent of E.  In the unemployment model, then, the effect of 
the current tariff on the future  s~te variable is proportional to  E,  as is the consumption cost of 
the current tariff.  Since the costs and benefits of a tariff are of the same order of magnitude. 
optimality will in general require using a non-zero tariff even as E~O. 
17  Karp and Paul (1994) provide the discrete stage version of the cost of adjustment 
model.  It is straightforward to write this down for the unemployment model, but in  order to 
conserve space we merely provide a verbal sketch. 30 
6.  Conclusion 
We studied the use of a second best policy to affect the reallocation of labor, 
following a shock such as that experienced by Central and East European countries.  We 
considered two extreme cases, in which the government has either unlimited or negligible 
ability to commit to future actions.  In the situation were the government has negligible 
ability to commit, we restricted attention to Markov Perfect Equilibria, thus ruling out 
reputational, or "grim trigger" strategies.  Those types of strategies may be of little use if the 
public expects the current government's tenure to be short. 
We asked whether externalities in the labor adjustment process justify gradual 
. liberalization, as opposed to the big bang.  We investigated whether the answer to this 
question depends on the extent to which governments are able to make credible commitments 
about their future behavior.  Comparison of the equilibrium conditions showed that the tariff 
is similar under unlimited or infinitesimal commitment ability when the annOlmcement effect 
is small.  In numerical examples, the equilibrium paths in the two cases are qualitatively the 
same, and involve gradual liberalization.  Therefore, the inability to make commitments does 
not necessarily provide an argu~ent against gradualism. 
This result was obtained for a migration model in which the current tariff has a first 
order effect on current migration.  We discussed another model in which current migration is 
:affected chiefly by the expectation of future tariffs.  For that model, the extent of commitment 
ability has a dramatic effect on the equilibrium tariff.  However, that model does not support 
the gradualist prescription for either of the two extreme assumptions about commitment 31 
ability.  The two models taken together therefore indicate that externalities in the labor 
adjustment process may justify gradual liberalization, but only if the current tariff affects 
current migration.  In that case, the inability to make commitments may be surprisingly 
unimportant. 
It is well-known that "commitment matters", in the sense that the equilibrium changes 
with the degree of commitment.  However, what is not known is whether commitment matters 
very much.  We think that this is the more interesting question.  Given current data, 
economists can hardly provide precise recommendations concerning policy trajectories. For 
the purpose of advising governments, the comparative statics of optimal trajectories with 
respect to small changes in commitment ability, is probably not very useful.  It is, however, 
useful to determine whether the shape of a policy trajectory is sensitive to large changes in 
commitment ability.  The framework we have used enables us  to answer this question. 
The relative merits of gradualism V  s. the big bang depend on many issues.  The 
. questionable ability of governments to make credible commitments is only one argument 
against gradualism.  Our results suggest that this argument may have been overstated. 32 
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Appendix A: 
The Private Adjustment Equilibrium Without Government Intervention 
By linearizing the dynamic system at the steady state, we can show that the steady 
state is a saddle point.  This procedure assumes that U ~  0 is not binding.  The L = 0 isocline 
is the positively sloped curve in Figure AI.  In the shaded region below this curve, the non-
negativity constraint on U is binding; all points on the segment EaEa• in Figure Al are steady 
states.  Therefore, any level of L in the interval [L·, Ea·]  is a steady state.  For initial values 
of L below L·, the size of the growing sector moves to L·; for initial conditions in the 
interval [L·, Ea.], the distribution of labor remains fixed;  for initial conditions L > Ea·, the 
economy moves immediately to Ea•.18 
Comparative statics with respect to the relative output price, p, are shown in Figure 
A2.  A decline in p shifts downwards the L = 0 locus and shifts upwards the q :: 0  locus, as 
shown by the dashed lines in the figure.  This leads to an increase in the value of L'I!,  given 
by the solution to (7).  The sign of the change in q. depends on the relative magnitudes of 1/r 
(a measure of agents' patience) and  lIf(O), the expected waiting time.  Figure A2 is drawn 
with the assumption that agents are "very patient" [lIr > lIf(O)] , so that q. increases when p 
falls.  If  the size of sector 2, prior to the price change, is less than L b in Figure A2 (e.g., at 
La), the sector grows.  If  the initial size is in the interval [Lb, La·], the price change does not 
alter the distribution of labor, although it does change the wage differential. 
18 In the limiting case as  f(O)  -+  00, the L = 0 isocline becomes the  horizontal axis.  In 
this case, wages in the two sectors are equal at the unique steady state, which.is independent 
of the initial condition. A-2 
If  the economy begins at a steady state such as La in Figure A2, a fall in the relative 
price of sector 1 causes the endogenous value of q to increase from qa to qO.  The price fall 
leads to an immediate discrete increase in unemployment and decrease in the size of sector 1. 
The equilibrium trajectory is shown as EOEb;  on this trajectory, L (the size of sector 2) 
increases and q decreases.  This implies that unemployment falls monotonically during the 
adjustment period: iT =  vLL + Vqq<  O.  The size of sector 1 is Ll =  L - L - V, which implies, 
using equation (2), Ll = [f(U)q + f'(U)qU]lRi2.  The two terms in the numerator have 
opposite signs, so the direction of the trajectory for labor in sector 1 is ambiguous.  However, 
in the limiting case where there is no congestion [f'(V) ==  0], Ll is· unambiguously positive. 
In this case, all quits occur immediately after the price fall; during the adjustment phase, 
some unemployed workers find jobs in sector 2, and some return to sector 1.  With 
congestion, however, sector 1 may continue to shrink for a period after the price fall. 
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Appendix B: 
Non-uniqueness of the MPE 
Here we explain why the MPE is not unique, and we relate this to  similar results in 
other models.  We also explain why we think that it is reasonable to select a particular MPE. 
The necessary conditions which define the equilibrium constitute a system of 
differential and algebraic equations, and transversality conditions. In standard control 
problems we fmd the steady state values by setting the differential equations equal to zero 
and use these with the first order conditions. This leads to a system n unknowns and n 
equations; if  the Jacobian of this system, evaluated at a steady state, is of full rank, then the 
steady state is "locally unique".  In other words, there does not exist an inteIYal of state space 
such that each point in that interval is a steady state. Even if the Jacobian is of full rank at a 
steady state, there may be multiple steady states, but these are at isolated points. In that case 
the equilibrium depends on the initial condition. 
Models that depend on agents' expectations exhibit another kind of non-uniqueness. 
There may be .intervals of state space such that every point in that interval is a steady state 
for some equilibrium; then the eguilibrium is not "locally unique" .19  In our model, there 
exists a continuum of steady states; to each of these there corresponds an equilibrium 
trajectory.  The intuition for non-uniqueness can be obtained simply by counting unknowns 
and steady state equilibrium conditions.  Using U = 0 in the steady state [from equation (3)] 
19  Even when the set of steady states are isolated points, there may be multiple equilibria 
that reach those states, as in  Krugman (1991). B-2 
we have six remaining unknown steady state values, L, q, A,  p, t, and dQldL.  However, we 
have only five linearly independent equations: the steady state's of (1) and (20), and the 
algebraic relations (2), (18) and (19).  Equation (3) and the consistency relation, equation 
(21), are linearly dependent in the steady state.  This means that (21) is vacuous in the steady 
state, although not, of course, outside it.  Equation (21) does not help pin down the steady 
state. Tsutsui and Mino (1990) note that an analogous situation arises in a MPE to some 
noncooperative differential games; they refer to this as an incomplete transversality condition. 
The method of counting unknowns and equilibrium conditions is suggestive, but does 
not provide a rigorous proof of non-uniqueness.  The reason is the following: Equation (21) 
can be written as dQldL = [rQ - d]/Uf(U).  In the steady state both the numerator and 
denominator vanish.  Since dQldL exists (by -assumption), we can evaluate the ratio using 
L'Hospital's Rule.  -Therefore, it is not obvious that equation (21) really provides no 
information in the steady state.  However, the application of L'Hospital's rule merely allows 
us to write the unknown function dQldL in terms of higher derivatives which are also 
unknown; therefore (21) is indeed vacuous in the steady state. 
In order to demonstrate this statement, it helps to rewrite the model using more 
concise notation.  To this end, ~e  use the constraints (2) and (9) to eliminate t  and Y, 
allowing us to write instantaneous social welfare as z(U,Q,L).  In a MPE the government 
takes the function Q(L) as given and chooses {U}  to maximize f7 e-rSz(U,Q,L)ds subject to 1. 
= g(U), where g(U) ==  Uf(U).  The dynamic programming equation for this problem is 
rl(L) = m: [  z(U,Q(L),L) + l'(L)g(U)]  .  (Bl) 
where primes denote derivatives.  The first order condition to  (Bl) can be inverted to  obtain B-3 
the control rule, which we write as U = B(Q,J',L).  Differentiating (BI) with respect to L and 
using the envelope theorem gives 
(B2) 
In a steady state, denoted by A,  we have 
.fA  AI  A 
BUtt,]  ,L) =  0  (B3) 
(B4) 
Defining the function F as F ==  g(B('», and using the fact that the equilibrium tariff is 
a function of L, Q and U, where U = B(QJ'  ,L), allows us to rewrite the consistency condition 
(21) as 
Q'  F(Q,]',L) :: rQ - d(Q,J',L) . 
,o.!\. 
,  .... .l..  j  -(B5) 
Equation (B5), evaluated at the steady state, implies 
A  A  A/  A 
rQ =  d(Q,]  ,L). 
'~. .  .  (36) 
Equations (B3), (B4) and (B6) comprise three equations in the four unknowns: Q,t,J' ,Q'. 
The question is whether ·we are able to use the limit as L ~  L of (B5) to obtain the final 
condition needed to select a locally unique steady state.  To this end, we differentiate (B5) 
with respect to L.  Evaluating the result at a steady state leads to an equation involving the 
four unknowns above, plus the higher order derivative J". If  we differentiate (B2), and 
evaluate the result at the steady state, we obtain an expression for J".  However, this contains 
-the unknown value Ct'.  It is clear that if we proceed in this manner, each additional equation 
obtained by differentiating again either (B2) or (B5), brings with it an additional unknown. 
Therefore, the restriction to a differentiable MPE does not imply a locally unique steady state. B-4 
In our model there is a plausible additional requirement which enables us to select a 
locally unique steady state for initial conditions which satisfy Lo  ~  L  *.  Recall that L  * is the 
solution to equation (5) and thus the smallest steady state under laissez faire;  see Figure AI. 
This gives us a "natural boundary condition" that can be used to select a steady state.  We 
noted in Section 2.2 that absent government intervention there is a continuum of steady states: 
values of L in the interval [L*  Ea*]  in Figure AI.  If  the size of sector 2 were in this interval, 
the government would have no incentive to intervene, even if  it were able to use a fIrst best 
wage subsidy.  Therefore,. it is reasonable that agents would expect the government not to 
intervene when sector 2 is in this region and the government has only second best policies. If 
agents do hold these expectations, the optimal policy for the government is to .set a zero tariff 
for L £  [L* Ea*].  Non-intervention is ther.efore obviously one equilibrium; forL £  [L* Ea*]. it 
seems the most reasonable one.  The natural boundary condition is that L*is a steady state. 
The requirement' that L* is a steady state allows us to solve (:83) and (B6) to obtain 
. the steady state values Q*  and ]'*.  Equation (BI) is then used to· obtain t. Given these 
boundary values, we can solve. the pair of ordinary differential equations (B I) and (B5) to 
obtain equilibrium functions J(L) and Q(L).  Given mild regularity assumptions on the 
·exogenous functions z(·) and g(.), this solution exists and is unique, at least in the 
neighborhood of the steady state. (See Boyce and DiPrima, page 268 for suffIcient 
. conditions;)  Once we have the functions J(L) and Q(L) we can write U as  a function of L 
using .the control rule U = B(·.)  ==  b(L).  At this level of generality, we can not eliminate the 
possibility that b'(L) ==  0 in an interval of L which includes L*;  this is analogous to the 
Jacobian, discussed in the second paragraph of this Appendix, being singular.  This is not an B-5 
interesting special case.  However, even if we ignore this possibility, and moreover assume 
that there exists a unique solution to  (BI) and (B5) for all L ~  L*, it may still be the case that 
beL) = 0 has a solution for L < L  *.  In that case, there are multiple steady states, which are 
isolated points.  Again, this possibility arises in standard control problems, and is not of 
special interest in our model. 
Given the solution to (B 1), U = beL), we can retrace the steps taken in constructing 
the function z(·), and retrieve the Markov tariff rule,  ~(L). December 21,  1994 
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